NetChoice v. Moody by 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
No. 21-12355 
In the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit 
 
NetChoice LLC, et al., 
          Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
Attorney General, State of Florida, et al., 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida 
 
BRIEF OF THE STATES OF TEXAS, ALABAMA, ALASKA 
ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, KENTUCKY, MISSISSIPPI, 
MISSOURI, MONTANA, AND SOUTH CAROLINA AS 
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS  
   
Ken Paxton 
Attorney General of Texas 
 
Brent Webster 
First Assistant Attorney General 
 
 
Office of the Attorney General 
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 
Tel.: (512) 936-1700 
Fax: (512) 474-2697 
Judd E. Stone II 
Solicitor General 
 
William F. Cole 











Certificate of Interested Persons 
No. 21-12355 
NetChoice LLC, et al., 
          Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
Attorney General, State of Florida, et al., 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
Amici Curiae certify that the following is a complete list of interested persons as 
required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, and Eleventh Circuit Rules 
26.1-1, 28-1(b), and 29-2: 
1. Allen, Jason Todd, Defendant/Appellant 
2. Allen, Kenneth Winn, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
3. American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Amicus Curiae 
4. American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae 
5. Authors Guild Inc., Amicus Curiae 
6. Barnes, Brian W., Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
7. Bassett, Glenn Allen, Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
8. Bell, Daniel William, Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
9. Blacklock, Evelyn, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellee 
10. Brnovich, Mark, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Arizona 
11. Burhans Jr., Glenn T., Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
12. Cameron, Daniel, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Kentucky 
13. Carome, Patrick J., Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
14. Center for Democracy and Technology, Amicus Curiae 
ii 
 
15. Chamber of Progress, Amicus Curiae 
16. Clark, Christopher Roy, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
17. Clement, Paul D., Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
18. Cole, William F., Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Texas 
19. Computer & Communications Industry Association, Plaintiff 
20.Connected Commerce Council, Amicus Curiae 
21. Consumer Technology Association, Amicus Curiae 
22. Cooper, Charles J., Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
23. Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
24. DLA Piper US LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
25. Eisenstein, Ilana Hope, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
26. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Amicus Curiae 
27. Engine Advocacy, Amicus Curiae 
28. Esparza, Servando, Declarant 
29. Fabens-Lassen, Ben, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
30. Fitch, Lynn, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Mississippi 
31. Florida Department of Management Services, Defendant/Appellant 
32. Florida Elections Commission, Defendant/Appellant 
33. Florida Office of the Attorney General, Attorneys for Defendants/Appel-
lants 
34. Gillespie, Patrick, Defendant/Appellant 
35. Goldstein, Leonid, Amicus Curiae 
36. Green, Jonathan Allen, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
iii 
 
37. Greene, David Allen, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
38. Hayes, John Martin, Defendant/Appellant 
39. Hinkle, Judge Robert L., District Court Judge 
40.Holtzblatt, Ari, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
41. Homer, Bonner, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
42. Homer, Peter Winslow, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
43. Hopkins, Christopher, Attorney for Amici Curiae 
44. Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, Amicus Curiae 
45. Internet Association, Amicus Curiae 
46. Johnson, Steffen N., Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
47. Karanjia, Peter, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
48. Kilby, Douglas Lamar, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
49. Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
50. Knudsen, Austin, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Montana 
51. Mackey, Aaron, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
52. Marshall, Steve, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Alabama 
53. Masterman, Joseph, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
54. McDonald Hopkins LLC, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
55. Media Law Resource Center Inc, Amicus Curiae 
56. Mitchell, Kasdin M., Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
57. Moody, Ashley B., Defendant/Appellant 
58. Morrison, Danielle T., Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
59. National Black Justice Coalition, Amicus Curiae 
iv 
 
60. NetChoice LLC, Plaintiff 
61. Oprison, Christopher George, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
62. Opsahl, Kurt, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
63. Pavlovic, Corinne, Declarant 
64. Paxton, Warren Kenneth, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Texas 
65. Pen American Center Inc., Amicus Curiae 
66. Phillips, Joseph Trumon, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
67. Poitier, Joni Alexis, Defendant/Appellant 
68. Potts, Neil, Declarant 
69. Progressive Policy Institute, Amicus Curiae 
70. Protect Democracy Project, Inc., Amicus Curiae 
71. Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press, Amicus Curiae 
72. Rumenap, Stacie D., Declarant 
73. Rutledge, Leslie, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Arkansas 
74. Schmitt, Eric, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Missouri 
75. Schruers, Matthew, Declarant 
76. Shullman, Deanna K, Attorney for Amici Curiae 
77. Shullman, Fugate PLLC, Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
78. Siekkinen, Nury Agudo, Attorney for Amici Curiae 
79. Smith, Kymberlee Curry, Defendant/Appellant 
80.Smitha, Bridget Kellogg, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 




82. Stone, Judd E. II, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Texas 
83. Szabo, Carl, Declarant 
84. Szoka, Berin Michael, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
85. Taylor, Treg, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Alaska 
86. TechFreedom, Amicus Curiae 
87. Technet, Amicus Curiae 
88. Thompson, David H., Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
89. Tienken, John W., Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
90. Treadwell, Raymond Frederick, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
91. Uthmeier, James William, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
92. Veitch, Alexandra, Declarant 
93. Walters Law Group, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
94. Walters, Lawrence G, Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
95. Washington Center for Technology Policy Inclusion, Amicus Curiae 
96. Webster, Brent, Attorney for Amicus Curiae State of Texas 
97. Whitaker, Henry C., Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
98. White, Lauren Gallo, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
99. Willen, Brian M., Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
100. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
101. Wilson, Alan, Attorney for Amicus Curiae South Carolina 
102. Winship, Blaine H., Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
103. Wolfson, Paul R., Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
104. Xi, James, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
vi 
 
105. Yang, Meng Jia, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
106. ZwillGen, Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
107. Undisclosed members of Appellees 
Apart from undisclosed members of Appellees, no publicly traded company or 
corporate has an interest in the outcome of this case or appeal. 
/s/ William F. Cole                         
William F. Cole 
Counsel of Record for 
Amici Curiae  
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Certificate of Interested Persons ..............................................................................i 
Table of Authorities ............................................................................................. viii 
Interests of Amici Curiae ........................................................................................ 1 
Argument................................................................................................................ 3 
I. S.B. 7072’s Neutrality and Disclosure Provisions Do Not 
Regulate Protected First Amendment Activity. ......................................... 3 
A. Social Media Platforms’ Content-Moderation Practices Are 
Conduct, Not Speech. ......................................................................... 5 
B. Social Media Platforms’ Content-Moderation Practices Are 
Not “Inherently Expressive” Conduct. .............................................. 6 
II. S.B. 7072’s Neutrality and Disclosure Provisions Do Not Impose 
Content-Based Restrictions. .................................................................... 12 
III. States Have a Compelling Interest in Ensuring their Citizens 
Enjoy Access to the Free Flow of Information and Ideas. ........................ 18 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 21 
Certificate of Compliance ..................................................................................... 22 





Table of Authorities 
Page(s) 
Cases: 
Citizens United v. F.E.C., 
558 U.S. 310 (2010) .......................................................................................... 15 
Coral Springs Street Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 
371 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 14 
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546 (2005) ......................................................................................... 17 
Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 
337 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) .......................................................................... 12 
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 
934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) ................................................................................ 11 
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 
901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 6, 11 
Garcia v. United States, 
469 U.S. 70 (1984) ........................................................................................... 17 
Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 
2 F.4th 871 (9th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................... 11 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
452 U.S. 640 (1981).......................................................................................... 13 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 
515 U.S. 557 (1995) ................................................................................. 4, 6, 8, 9 
Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789 (1984) ......................................................................................... 13 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241 (1974) ........................................................................................ 8, 9 
Nat. Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 
432 U.S. 43 (1997) .............................................................................................. 4 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 
475 U.S.1 (1986) ............................................................................................. 8, 9 
Packingham v. North Carolina, 
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) .................................................................................... 1, 19 
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92 (1972) ............................................................................................. 4 
ix 
 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
576 U.S. 155 (2015) ........................................................... 4, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 
Rumsfeld v. Forum of Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 
547 U.S. 47 (2006) ........................................................................ 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
564 U.S. 552 (2011) ............................................................................................ 4 
Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405 (1974) ............................................................................................ 6 
Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359 (1931) ............................................................................................ 4 
Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397 (1989) ............................................................................................ 6 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503 (1969) ............................................................................................ 4 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 
512 U.S. 622 (1994) .......................................................... 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20 
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 
406 U.S. 649 (1972) ......................................................................................... 19 
United States v. O’Brien., 
391 U.S. 367 (1968) ..................................................................................... 16, 17 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781 (1989) .......................................................................................... 16 
West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943) ............................................................................................ 4 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Legislative Materials: 
U.S. Const. amend. I ............................................ 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 
Fla. Stat.: 
§ 501.2041(1)(b) ................................................................................................. 2 
§ 501.2041(1)(c) ................................................................................................. 2 
§ 501.2041(1)(f) ................................................................................................. 2 
§ 501.2041(2)(a) ............................................................................ 2, 4, 10, 13, 19 
§ 501.2041(2)(b) ................................................................................. 2, 5, 10, 13 
§ 501.2041(2)(d) ................................................................................................ 2 
§ 501.2041(2)(d)(1) ................................................................................. 4, 10, 19 
§ 501.2041(2)(e) ............................................................................... 4, 10, 13, 19 
x 
 
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code: 
§ 120.051 ............................................................................................................ 2 
§ 120.103(a) ....................................................................................................... 2 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §143a.002 ................................................................. 2 
S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021) (enacted) ..................................... 19 
Act of Sept. 2, 2021, 87th Leg., 2d C.S., H.B. 20 ................................................ 1, 2 
Other Authorities: 
Disinformation Nation: Social Media’s Role in Promoting Extremism and 
Misinformation: Joint Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 117th 
Cong. 8 (2021) (statement of Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet, Inc.) .................... 8 
Facebook, Google and Twitter: Examining the Content Filtering Practices of 
Social Media Giants: Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Nick Pickles, Senior Strategist, Public Pol-
icy, Twitter, Inc.) ............................................................................................... 7 
Will Feuer, TikTok Says it Doesn’t Censor Content, but a User was Just Locked 
Out After a Viral Post Criticizing China, CNBC (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://tinyurl.com/t2ajzjb5 .............................................................................. 8 
Hearing, Free Speech & Social Media: H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 2021 Leg. 
(Ga. May 20, 2021) ............................................................................................ 1 
Matthew P. Hooker, Censorship, Free Speech & Facebook: Applying the First 
Amendment to Social Media Platforms Via the Public Function Exception, 
15 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 36 (2019) ..............................................................20 
Jennifer Huddleston & Liam Fulling, Examining State Tech Policy Actions in 
2021, Am. Action Forum (July 21, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/2vhftt42 ............ 1 
News Release, Office of Ron DeSantis, 46th Governor of Florida, Governor 
Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech 
(May 24, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/2a49nbc2 .......................................... 16, 18 
Mike Snider, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg Says the Social Network Should Not 
be ‘Censoring Politicians,’ USA Today (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://tinyurl.com/4ae66m9a .......................................................................... 8 
Social Media Censorship Complaint Form, Ala. Attorney Gens. Office, 
https://tinyurl.com/nb8rpz3j (last accessed Sept. 14, 2021) .............................. 1 
Social Media Complaint Form, Attorney Gen. Jeff Landry, La. Dep’t of 
Justice, https://tinyurl.com/338meu8h (last accessed Sept. 14, 2021) ............... 1 
xi 
 
Brian Stelter, Twitter’s Jack Dorsey: ‘We are not’ discriminating against any 
political viewpoint, CNN (Aug. 20, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/fe8jw9e8 ........... 7 
Stifling Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse: Hearing 
Before Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 
1 (2019) (responses to questions for the record for Carlos Monje, Jr., Di-




Interests of Amici Curiae  
The States have a strong interest in ensuring that their citizens enjoy access to 
the free flow of information and ideas in “the modern public square” that is the so-
cial media marketplace. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
But the social-media ecosystem, run by an increasingly small number of large com-
panies who function as the gatekeepers of online content, threatens the States’ abil-
ity to meet this salutary goal. That marketplace is susceptible to well-documented 
arbitrariness, censorship, and other forms of editorial abuse at the hands of these 
gatekeepers, many of which are members of Plaintiffs’ trade associations. See, e.g., 
App.891-1693 (collecting examples). 
To remedy this situation, many States are examining this problem and have been 
considering legislation that aims to restore order and fairness to the social-media 
market. See, e .g., Hearing, Free Speech & Social Media: H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 
2021 Leg. (Ga. May 20, 2021); Social Media Censorship Complaint Form, Ala. Attor-
ney Gens. Office, https://tinyurl.com/nb8rpz3j (last accessed Sept. 14, 2021); Social 
Media Complaint Form, Attorney Gen. Jeff Landry, La. Dep’t of Justice, https://ti-
nyurl.com/338meu8h (last accessed Sept. 14, 2021). By one count, “[a]t least 30 
state legislatures have introduced some form of a content-moderation bill in this 
[past] legislative session.” Jennifer Huddleston & Liam Fulling, Examining State 
Tech Policy Actions in 2021, Am. Action Forum (July 21, 2021), https://ti-
nyurl.com/2vhftt42.  
Some States have already enacted such legislation. Texas, for example, recently 
passed, and Governor Abbott signed into law, H.B. 20. See Act of Sept. 2, 2021, 87th 
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Leg., 2d C.S., H.B. 20 (to be codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §143a.002). 
That law forbids social media platforms to “censor a user, a user’s expression, or a 
user’s ability to receive the expression of another person based on” viewpoint or 
geographic location. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143a.002 (to be codified per 
H.B. 20, supra, § 7). It also requires social media platforms to provide written notice 
to users if their content is removed, explain the reason for that removal, and publicly 
disclose their content moderation practices. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 120.051, 
120.103(a) (to be codified per H.B. 20, supra, § 2).  
Texas is not alone. Florida’s S.B. 7072—the law at issue in this appeal—con-
tains similar provisions to Texas’s H.B. 20. A neutrality provision requires social 
media platforms to “apply censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning stand-
ards in a consistent manner among its users on the platform.” Fla. Stat. 
§ 501.2041(2)(b).1 And disclosure provisions require social media platforms to 
“publish the standards . . . used for determining how to censor, deplatform, and 
shadow ban,” id. § 501.2041(2)(a), and to notify users when they are censored, de-
platformed, or shadow banned, id. § 501.2041(2)(d).  
 
1 “Censor” is defined as “any action taken by a social media platform to delete, 
regulate, restrict, edit, alter, inhibit the publication or republication of, suspend a 
right to post, remove, or post an addendum to any content or material posted by a 
user.” Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(b). “Deplatform” is defined as “the action or prac-
tice by a social media platform to permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily 
delete or ban a user from the social media platform for more than 14 days.” Id. 
§ 501.2041(1)(c). And a “shadow ban” is “action by a social media platform . . . to 
limit or eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material posted by a user to 
other users of the social media platform.” Id. § 501.2041(1)(f). 
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These provisions of S.B. 7072—along with many of that bill’s other provi-
sions—were preliminarily enjoined by the district court in this case, in part on the 
ground that S.B. 7072 implements content-based restrictions on speech that violate 
the First Amendment. But the district court’s First Amendment analysis is riddled 
with errors. It veered off course from the outset by concluding that S.B. 7072 regu-
lates speech, when that law instead regulates conduct that is unprotected by the First 
Amendment: social media platforms’ arbitrary application of their content modera-
tion policies. The district court also mistook S.B. 7072 for a content-based law and 
subjected it to strict scrutiny when the law is in fact content-neutral and therefore 
subject to more deferential constitutional review. Finally, in assessing the govern-
mental interest in S.B. 7072, the court completely ignored the States’ long-estab-
lished compelling interest in ensuring that its citizens have access to the free flow of 
information and ideas.  
If the district court’s faulty analysis is not corrected by this Court, the errant 
legal theories it endorsed could be adopted by other courts around the country and 
imperil similar laws such as Texas’s H.B. 20 and those that may soon be enacted into 
law throughout the country. The States thus have a keen interest in this case, and 
they submit this brief to aid the Court in resolving these novel constitutional issues.  
Argument 
I. S.B. 7072’s Neutrality and Disclosure Provisions Do Not Regulate 
Protected First Amendment Activity. 
The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause forbids the government to “re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” 
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Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mos-
ley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). This prohibition extends not only to laws “telling people 
what they must say,” but also to certain “conduct that is inherently expressive.” 
Rumsfeld v. Forum of Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61, 66 (2006) 
(“FAIR”). The Supreme Court has recognized such conduct as including saluting a 
flag (and refusing to do so), West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 
(1943), wearing an armband to protest a war, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969), displaying a red flag, Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931), and even “[m]arching, walking, or parading” in uniforms 
displaying the swastika, Nat. Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1997). 
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).  
Aside from these core First Amendment activities, however, the Free Speech 
Clause allows States to legislate with a freer hand. As relevant here, “the First 
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from 
imposing incidental burdens on speech.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 
567 (2011). And in this case, S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions, see Fla. 
Stat. § 501.2041(2)(a), (2)(d)(1), (2)(e), do not run afoul of the First Amendment. 
These statutory requirements regulate conduct—the disjointed and arbitrary man-
ner in which Plaintiffs’ members apply content-moderation standards. At most, 
these provisions impose an incidental burden on speech. And for that reason, the 
district court erred in applying the First Amendment to Florida’s S.B.7072. 
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A. Social Media Platforms’ Content-Moderation Practices Are Con-
duct, Not Speech. 
Nothing in S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions regulates the speech 
of Plaintiffs or the members of their trade associations—they “neither limit[] what 
[Plaintiffs or their members] may say nor require[] them to say anything.” FAIR, 
547 U.S. at 60. Instead, at most these provisions regulate the conduct of Plaintiffs and 
their members: their arbitrary and blunderbuss content-moderation policies. See, 
e.g., Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b) (“[a] social media platform must apply censorship, 
deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among its us-
ers on the platform”). 
The Supreme Court’s decision in FAIR is instructive. There the Court consid-
ered whether a congressional statute requiring institutions of higher education to al-
low military recruiters on their campuses comported with the First Amendment. 
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 51. In holding that it did, the Court reasoned that the statute “reg-
ulates conduct, not speech.” Id. at 60. That was because the statute “affects what 
law schools must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may 
or may not say.” Id. The same is true here. Like the law-school plaintiffs at issue in 
FAIR, here Plaintiffs’ members “remain free . . . to express whatever views they may 
have.” Id. S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions, therefore, only affect 
what Plaintiffs’ members “do” in the context of content moderation, “not what they 
may or may not say.” Id. 
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B. Social Media Platforms’ Content-Moderation Practices Are Not 
“Inherently Expressive” Conduct. 
Even if a particular law does not regulate speech as such, certain “inherently 
expressive” conduct may nonetheless qualify for First Amendment protection. Id. 
at 66-67 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)). To determine whether 
such conduct is “sufficiently expressive” to merit First Amendment protection, this 
Court considers: “(1) whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was 
present;’ and (2) whether ‘in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great 
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” Fort Lauderdale 
Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2018) (quot-
ing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). Plaintiffs’ members’ content 
moderation practices do not satisfy either element. 
1. Plaintiffs’ attempt to cloak their preference for arbitrary censorship, deplat-
forming, and shadow banning in the First Amendment falters from the first step: 
neither Plaintiffs nor the district court has ever identified a “particularized message” 
that Plaintiffs or its members wish to present. Id. While “a narrow, succinctly artic-
ulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 
569, there must be some message that the speaker “inten[ds] to convey,” cf. Fort 
Lauderdale Food, 901 F.3d at 1240 (identifying one message intended to be conveyed 
as “society can end hunger and poverty if we redirect our collective resources from 
the military and war”).” No such message has been identified here. 
Far from identifying a message that they wish to convey through arbitrary appli-
cation of their content-moderation policies, Plaintiffs’ members have repeatedly—
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and very publicly—abjured the notion that they are expressing any message, articu-
lating a viewpoint, or conveying a political ideology while engaged in content mod-
eration. Consider the example of Twitter. Its CEO, Jack Dorsey, has explained: “Are 
we doing something according to political ideology or viewpoints? We are not. Period 
.  .  .  . We do not look at content with regards to political viewpoint or ideology. We 
look at behavior.” Brian Stelter, Twitter’s Jack Dorsey: ‘We are not’ discriminating 
against any political viewpoint, CNN (Aug. 20, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/fe8jw9e8 
(insisting that policies “look at content” not speech). The company has assured a 
committee of the U.S. House of Representatives that its rules “are not based on ide-
ology or a particular set of beliefs” but instead “based on behavioral contexts.” Fa-
cebook, Google and Twitter: Examining the Content Filtering Practices of Social Media 
Giants: Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement 
of Nick Pickles, Senior Strategist, Public Policy, Twitter, Inc.). And it has likewise 
informed a subcommittee of the United States Senate that “Twitter does not use 
political viewpoints, perspectives, or party affiliation to make any decisions, whether 
related to automatically ranking content on our service or how we develop or enforce 
our rules.” Stifling Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 
(2019) (responses to questions for the record for Carlos Monje, Jr., Director of Pub-
lic Policy & Philanthropy, U.S. & Canada, Twitter, Inc.). 
Twitter is not alone. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has stated that Facebook 
would not “take down political advertisements on the social network even if the ads 
contain false information” and that to do so would be “an infringement on free 
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speech.” Mike Snider, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg Says the Social Network Should 
Not be ‘Censoring Politicians,’ USA Today (Dec. 2, 2019), https://ti-
nyurl.com/4ae66m9a. Similarly, Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai testified before Con-
gress that Alphabet’s companies, like Google and YouTube, “strive to have clear 
and transparent policies and enforce them without regard to political party or point 
of view.” Disinformation Nation: Social Media’s Role in Promoting Extremism and Mis-
information: Joint Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 117th Cong. 8 (2021) 
(statement of Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet, Inc.). And representatives from Tik-
Tok have emphatically stated that the company “does not moderate content due to 
political sensitivities.” Will Feuer, TikTok Says it Doesn’t Censor Content, but a User 
was Just Locked Out After a Viral Post Criticizing China, CNBC (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://tinyurl.com/t2ajzjb5.  
Despite a dearth of evidence supporting the notion that Plaintiffs or their mem-
bers intend to convey a message, the district court resisted this conclusion by char-
acterizing their arbitrary content-moderation policies as the “exercise [of] editorial 
judgment” in “ideologically sensitive cases,” and by citing three purportedly analo-
gous cases that limit the government’s ability to force one speaker to host or accom-
modate another speaker’s message. App.1716 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557, and Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S.1 (1986)).  
The key flaw in the district court’s analysis is that the First Amendment viola-
tion in those three cases “resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own 
message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate.” FAIR, 547 U.S. 
at 63 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ members have disclaimed the 
intent to express a message in conjunction with their hosting of user-generated con-
tent. Supra at 6-8. For that reason, S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions 
are nothing like a statutory requirement that a newspaper’s editorial page afford a 
political candidate equal space to reply to criticism levied by the paper’s editors. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243-45. They are not comparable to forcing the organizers of a 
St. Patrick’s Day Parade—which is an inherently expressive activity—to include 
participants whose own activity would detract from the “particularized message” 
that the parade organizers want to convey about “what merits celebration on that 
day.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569, 574. And they are far afield of a regulatory requirement 
that a utility company include a third party’s newsletter alongside its own newslet-
ters, which were sent to customers and which had been long used to disseminate 
“political editorials, feature stories on matters of public interest, tips on energy con-
servation, and straightforward information about utility services and bills.” Pac. Gas 
& Elec., 475 U.S. at 5-7. Put simply, Plaintiffs’ conduct “lack[s] the expressive qual-
ity of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a newspaper.” FAIR, 547 U.S. 
at 64. 
Instead of Tornillo, Hurley, and Pacific Gas & Electric, the circumstances of this 
case are analogous to the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in FAIR. There, the 
Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge a congressional statute requiring 
institutions of higher education to allow military recruiters on their campuses. Id. at 
51. In response to arguments by an association of law schools that the statute violated 




Court held that the statute “regulates conduct, not speech.” Id. at 60. The Court 
observed that the statute at issue “does not dictate the content of the speech at all” 
and that any burden on the plaintiffs’ speech was “plainly incidental to the . . . reg-
ulation of conduct.” Id. at 62. After all, “the schools are not speaking when they host 
interviews and recruiting receptions.” Id. at 64. And “send[ing] e-mails and 
post[ing] notices on behalf of the military” is the type of “incidental” burden on 
speech that is a “far cry” from what the Court has held abridges a party’s right to 
free speech. Id. at 61-62. 
The same is true here. S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions do not 
regulate, much less dictate the content of, the “speech” of Plaintiffs or their mem-
bers; they only regulate “conduct”—arbitrary application of content moderation 
policies. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b) (“[a] social media platform must apply cen-
sorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among 
its users on the platform”). Moreover, social media platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter are not themselves speaking when they provide a platform for hosting the 
speech of their users. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64. And the requirements that Plaintiffs’ 
members apply any deplatforming, censorship, and shadow banning in an even-
handed manner and provide disclosures to affected users, Fla. Stat. 
§ 501.2041(2)(a), (2)(d)(1), (2)(e), are akin to the “incidental” burden on speech 
visited upon the law schools in FAIR who had to send e-mails and post notices about 
military recruiting.  
2. For similar reasons, Plaintiffs cannot show that “the surrounding circum-
stances would lead the reasonable observer to view the conduct as conveying some 
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sort of message.” Fort Lauderdale Food, 901 F.3d at 1242. At least with regard to 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter, which claim only to seek to connect their bil-
lions of users with one another, the “likelihood” that any “message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it” is nonexistent. Id. at 1240. When an individual uses 
Google or Bing to search for instructions on how to change a tire, he or she is not 
expecting the results returned to convey some message from Google or Bing, and, 
unsurprisingly, does not see one.  
This conclusion is consistent with the nature of social-media platforms. Courts 
of Appeals agree that, generally, social media sites “use[] features and functions, 
including algorithms, to analyze user posts and recommend other user groups.” Gon-
zalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 894 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Those “func-
tions—recommendations and notifications—were tools meant to facilitate the com-
munication and content of others, and not content in and of themselves.” Id. 
(cleaned up). When a social media provider treats speakers the same and “employ[s] 
neutral tools,” they are simply “match[ing] what [they] know[] about users based 
on their historical actions and send[ing] third-party content to users that [they] an-
ticipate[] they will prefer.” Id. at 894-95. For that reason, courts routinely reject 
claims that speech by users of the social-media sites is indistinguishable from the 
speech of the platform itself. See id. (rejecting at the pleading stage an argument that 
Google “creat[es] and develop[s]” ISIS content that appears on YouTube); Force v. 
Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 76–78 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020) 
(rejecting claim that Facebook “‘develop[s]’ the content of the Facebook postings 
by Hamas”); cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (“Given 
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cable’s long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little 
risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable 
system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.”). This Court 
should do the same. 
II. S.B. 7072’s Neutrality and Disclosure Provisions Do Not Impose Con-
tent-Based Restrictions. 
The district court’s conclusion that S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure and 
provisions violate the First Amendment is erroneous for a second reason: those pro-
visions are not content-based regulations subject to strict scrutiny. Contra App.1718-
19. “Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative con-
tent—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the govern-
ment proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” 
Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. But because S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions 
are content-neutral, the district court should have never applied strict scrutiny. See 
Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (content-
neutral laws are “entitled to a deferential, or intermediate, level of constitutional 
scrutiny”). 
“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular 
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed, 576 
U.S. at 163. Some laws are facially content-based, “defining regulated speech by par-
ticular subject matter” or “by its function or purpose.” Id. Others are facially con-
tent-neutral but will be considered “content-based” either because they “cannot be 
‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’” or because they 
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“were adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the 
speech] conveys.’” Id. at 164. Still others are truly content-neutral: “laws that confer 
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views ex-
pressed are in most instances content neutral.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 643; see also Mem-
bers of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (ordi-
nance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property “is neutral—indeed it is 
silent—concerning any speaker’s point of view”); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) (State fair regulation requiring that sales 
and solicitations take place at designated locations “applies evenhandedly to all who 
wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds”). 
In this case, S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure requirements are content neu-
tral. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b). These regulations do not “draw distinctions based 
on the message a speaker conveys,” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163, but instead are “silent . . . 
concerning any speaker’s point of view,” Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804. The 
neutrality provision, for example, requires a social media platform to “apply censor-
ship, deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among its 
users on the platform.” Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b) (emphasis added). Likewise, the 
disclosure provisions merely require social media platforms to “publish the stand-
ards . . . used for determining how to censor, deplatform, and shadow ban,” id. 
§ 501.2041(2)(a), and to notify users when they are censored, deplatformed, or 
shadow banned, id. § 501.2041(2)(e).  
These provisions are quintessential content-neutral regulations: they “confer 
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views 
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expressed.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 643. And “[n]othing in [them] imposes a restriction, 
penalty, or burden by reason of the views” that the social media platform “has se-
lected or will select.” Id. at 644. After all, these provisions neither forbid nor encour-
age social media platforms to censor, deplatform, or shadow ban—they merely re-
quire those companies to apply content-moderation standards in a consistent way 
and provide notice to users who are subjected to such censorship, deplatforming, or 
shadow banning. In other words, these provisions can be applied—indeed, are writ-
ten to be applied—“without reference to the content of [any] regulated speech.” 
Reed, 576 U.S. at 164.  
The district court did not single out the neutrality or disclosure provisions as 
content-based, but it nevertheless concluded that every subsection of sec-
tion 540.2041 was content-based and must be enjoined.2 It appears to have done so 
for two reasons. First, it concluded that the statute’s definition of “social media plat-
form” only makes S.B. 7072 applicable to companies with $100 million in revenues 
or 100 million monthly participants, and this is a “tell for content discrimination.” 
App.1720. Second, the district court inferred from statements of legislators that the 
“actual motivation for this legislation was hostility to social media platforms’ 
 
2 Though the district court pointed to other provisions of S.B. 7072 besides its 
neutrality and disclosure provisions to establish that the law as a whole is content-
based, App.1719, an analysis of those provisions are outside the scope of this brief. 
To the extent that this Court believes that other provisions of S.B. 7072 are uncon-
stitutional, the constitutionally sound provisions—like the neutrality and disclosure 
requirements—should be severed. See Coral Springs Street Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 
371 F.3d 1320, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Florida law clearly favors (where possible) 
severance of the invalid portions of a law from the valid ones.”).  
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perceived liberal viewpoint.” App.1719. Neither of these rationales can justify the 
district court’s sweeping, overbroad injunction. 
1. In support of the conclusion that S.B. 7072 is content-based in toto because it 
only regulates large social media platforms, the district court relied principally on a 
single statement from Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that “[s]peech 
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to 
control content.” 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); see App.1720-21. But this solitary state-
ment, plucked out of context, has no application here. In the immediately preceding 
sentence, the Supreme Court makes clear that laws drawing distinctions among 
speakers are constitutionally suspect not in the abstract but only when the effect is 
to “allow[] speech by some [speakers] but not others.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
340; see also Turner, 512 U.S. at 658 (“speaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny 
when they reflect the Government’s preference for the substance of what the favored 
speakers have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say)”). Yet 
S.B. 7072’s definition of “social media platform” hardly “allow[s] speech by some 
but not others.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. It merely defines the class of enti-
ties who may be subject to the law’s restrictions. Nor do S.B. 7072’s neutrality and 
disclosure provisions restrict the speech of some parties and not others; as described 
above, they merely require even-handed application of content-moderation stand-
ards and disclosure to users affected by their application. Supra at 13-14.  
The flaw in the district court’s reasoning is laid bare by consideration of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Turner. There the Supreme Court upheld against a First 
Amendment challenge FCC regulations requiring “cable operators to carry the 
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signals of a specified number of local broadcast television stations.” Turner, 512 U.S. 
at 630. The Court concluded that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral 
even though they only applied to cable operators with more than 300 subscribers. Id. 
at 644 (“the rules impose obligations upon all operators, save those with fewer than 
300 subscribers”). The fact that the FCC’s must-carry rules drew distinctions 
among cable operators by size simply did not raise an issue of constitutional import. 
The same is true here. 
2. The district court also erred by justifying its decision to enjoin S.B. 7072 in its 
entirety by speculating that “the actual motivation for this legislation was hostility 
to the social media platforms’ perceived liberal viewpoint.” App.1719. To be sure, 
facially-neutral laws may be deemed content-based when they are “adopted by the 
government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.’” 
Reed, 576 U.S. at 164 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)). But here, the district court’s attempt to divine such a legislative purpose 
from statements of legislators that were collected in a press release by Governor De-
Santis’s office is flawed as both a legal and factual matter. See News Release, Office 
of Ron DeSantis, 46th Governor of Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop 
the Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech (May 24, 2021), https://ti-
nyurl.com/2a49nbc2.  
Legally, this argument is foreclosed by United States v. O’Brien. There, the Su-
preme Court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to mine the legislative history of a fed-
eral statute, challenged on First Amendment grounds, that prohibited the burning of 
draft cards. 391 U.S. 367, 383-86 (1968). In concluding that such a free-floating 
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inquiry into legislative purpose had no proper place in the First Amendment analysis, 
the Court held that “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazard-
ous matter” particularly where a court is “asked to void a statute that is, under well-
settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful 
of Congressmen said about it.” Id. at 383-84. That is because “[w]hat motivates one 
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores 
of others to enact it.” Id.at 384; see also Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“[j]udicial investigation of legislative history has a ten-
dency to become . . . an exercise in looking over a crowd and picking out your 
friends”); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“We have eschewed reli-
ance on the passing comments of one Member, and casual statements from the floor 
debates.” (cleaned up)). 
Factually, even if snippets of statements made by a handful of legislators consti-
tuted legally competent evidence of the collective intent of all of Florida’s 160 legis-
lators—and they do not—those statements do not show an intent to regulate content 
“because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.” Reed, 576 U.S. 
at 164. Far from “suppress[ing] disfavored speech,” id. at 167, these legislators’ 
statements evince a desire to expand the range of ideas hosted on social media plat-
forms. Were it otherwise, one would expect to see statements from legislators extol-
ing the law’s ability to squelch disfavored political viewpoints. But the opposite is 
true. For example, the Lieutenant Governor is quoted as praising the law’s purpose 
of reversing the trend of “silenc[ing], intimidat[ing], and wip[ing] out dissenting 
voices” and restoring the “virtual public square as a place where information and 
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ideas can flow freely.” News Release, supra at 16. The Senate President noted that 
the law would safeguard the “right to express opposing views” and forestall “unfair 
and arbitrary discrimination on social media platforms.” Id. The Speaker of the 
House lauded S.B. 7072’s purpose of “protect[ing] the free speech of Floridians and 
demand[ing] transparency” from social medial platforms. Id. And Senator Ro-
drigues explained that S.B. 7072 will help to instill “fair[ness] and transparen[cy]” 
in the practices of social media platforms—“regardless of our political ideology.” Id.  
Evidence of censorious intent these statements are not. The district court thus 
clearly erred in pointing to statements of legislators exalting the benefits of unbiased 
content moderation and the free flow of ideas to support the notion that S.B. 7072 
was somehow intended to facilitate viewpoint discrimination. 
III. States Have a Compelling Interest in Ensuring their Citizens Enjoy 
Access to the Free Flow of Information and Ideas. 
The district court further erred by giving short shrift to the compelling interest 
that Florida is seeking to advance through S.B. 7072—namely, ensuring that its citi-
zens enjoy access to the free flow of information and ideas, unencumbered by arbi-
trary and erratic censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning. The district court 
perfunctorily asserted that “levelling the playing field—promoting speech on one 
side of an issue or restricting speech on the other—is not a legitimate state interest.” 
App.1722. But that is flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
“assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a gov-
ernmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First 
Amendment.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court has long 
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observed that “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.” United States v. Mid-
west Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality op.). 
S.B. 7072 is directed precisely to vindicating this governmental interest. The 
bill’s legislative findings recognize that social media platforms “have transformed 
into the new public town square” and “hold a unique place in preserving first amend-
ment protections for all Floridians.” S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021) 
(enacted). Despite this, the Legislature notes, social media platforms have “unfairly 
censored, shadow banned, deplatformed, and applied post-prioritization algorithms 
to Floridians.” Id. As a result, and because “[t]he state has a substantial interest in 
protecting its residents from inconsistent and unfair actions by social media plat-
forms,” S.B. 7072 enacts a variety of provisions designed to secure Floridians’ right 
to access “public opinion” through the free flow of ideas. Id. As discussed, included 
among these statutory protections are S.B. 7072’s neutrality provision—aimed at 
ensuring that social media platforms apply content-moderation policies consist-
ently—and its disclosure provisions—aimed at informing users when they are sub-
jected to censorship, deplatforming, or shadow banning. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(a), 
(2)(d)(1), (2)(e). 
Safeguarding this interest is particularly urgent in the context of social media 
platforms, which have become “the modern public square.” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1737. Unlike a traditional newspaper, and more akin to a cable operator, social me-
dia platforms “exercise[] . . . great[] control over access to the relevant medium” 
and possess the power “to obstruct readers’ access to” information and even 
20 
“prevent” the distribution of certain information that they do not like. 
Turner, 512 U.S. at 656. Thus, “[b]y virtue of its ownership of the essential 
pathway,” a social media platform “can . . . silence the voice of competing 
speakers with a mere flick of the switch.” Id. “The potential for abuse of this 
private power over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked.” Id. 
at 657; see also Matthew P. Hooker, Censorship, Free Speech & Facebook: Applying 
the First Amendment to Social Media Platforms Via the Public Function Exception, 15 
Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 36, 43-44 (2019) (collecting examples of “arbitrary” 
application of content-moderation policies by social media platforms). Accordingly, 
“[t]he First Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of 
speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private 
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of 
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